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ABSTRACT
Prediction Markets, sometimes referred to as "information markets," "idea futures" or "event
futures", are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoffs are tied to a future event,
thereby  yielding  prices  that  can  be  interpreted  as  market-aggregated  forecasts.  This  article
summarizes the recent literature on prediction markets, highlighting both theoretical contributions
that emphasize the possibility that these markets efficiently aggregate disperse information, and the
lessons from empirical applications which show that market-generated forecasts typically outperform
most moderately sophisticated benchmarks. Along the way, we highlight areas ripe for future
research.
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Prediction Markets 
 
Prediction Markets, sometimes referred to as “information markets,” “idea 
futures” or “event futures”, are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoffs 
are tied to a future event, thereby yielding prices that can be interpreted as market-
aggregated forecasts.  For instance, in the Iowa Electronic Market, traders buy and sell 
contracts that pay $1 if a given candidate wins the election.  If a prediction market is 
efficient, then the prices of these contracts perfectly aggregate dispersed information 
about the probability of each candidate being elected.  Markets designed specifically 
around this information aggregation and revelation motive are our focus in this article. 
 
Types of Prediction Markets 
 
The most famous prediction markets are the election forecasting markets run by 
the University of Iowa (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz, 2001).  Election forecasting 
provides a useful way to introduce a variety of different contract types, and Table 1, 
adapted from Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004a), shows how different contracts can be 
designed to reveal various types of forecasts. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
The three main types of contracts link payoffs to the occurrence of a specific 
event (the incumbent wins the election), a continuous variable (the vote share of the 
incumbent), or to a combination of the two, such as in spread betting.  In each case, the 
relevant contract will reveal the market’s expectation of a specific parameter: a 
probability, mean, or median, respectively.  More complex contract designs can also be 
used to elicit alternative parameters.  For instance, a family of winner-take-all contracts—
each linked to different states of nature—can reveal the full probability distribution. 
Prediction markets have been used to forecast elections, movie revenues, 
corporate sales, project completion, economic indicators and Saddam Hussein’s demise.  
New corporate applications have emerged as firms have looked to markets to predict   2 
research and development outcomes, success of new products, and regulatory outcomes. 
In the public sector, the Pentagon attempted to use markets designed  to predict 
geopolitical risks, although negative publicity stopped the project (Hanson, 2005).  An 
intriguing attempt to apply prediction markets to forecasting influenza outbreaks is 
detailed in Nelson, Polgreen and Neumann (2006).  Rhode and Strumpf (2004) have 
detailed the existence of large-scale election betting as far back as the election of 
Washington. 
Prediction market contracts have been traded in a variety of market designs, 
including continuous double auctions (both with and without market-makers), pari-




Prediction Markets in Theory: Information Aggregation 
 
The claim that prediction markets can efficiently aggregate information is based 
on the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  In certain cases, existing theoretical results 
regarding efficient capital markets can be applied directly.  Grossman (1976) documents 
a set of sufficient conditions for the equilibrium price of index futures to summarize 
private information perfectly: In a market where traders with CARA utility functions 
each receive independent draws from a normal distribution about the true value of the 
asset, the market price fully summarizes their information. 
Manski (2004) noted that much of the analysis of the price of binary options had 
simply assumed that these revealed a market-based probability estimate, but that 
appropriate theoretical results were lacking.  He illustrates the importance of this issue by 
way of an example where prediction market prices fail to aggregate information 
appropriately.  In his model all traders are willing to risk exactly $100.  Thus if a contract 
paying $1 if an event occurs, is selling for $0.667, then buyers each purchase 150 
contracts, while sellers can afford to sell 300 contracts (at a price of $0.333).  This can 
only be an equilibrium if there are twice as many buyers as sellers, implying that the 
market price must fall at the 33
rd percentile of the belief distribution, rather than the   3 
mean.  The same logic suggests that a prediction market price of ￿ implies that 1-￿% of 
the population believes that the event has less than a ￿% chance of occurring.  Clearly the 
driving force in this example is the assumption that all traders are willing to risk a fixed 
amount. 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005a) provide sufficient conditions under which 
prediction market prices coincide with average beliefs among traders (and hence 
aggregate all information in the Grossman setup).  They consider individuals with log 
utility and initial wealth, y, who must choose how many prediction market securities, x, to 
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Thus under log utility, the prediction market price equals the mean belief among 
traders.  If wealth is correlated with beliefs, then the prediction market price is equal to a 
wealth-weighted average belief.  This finding is general in the sense that no assumptions 
are required about the distribution of beliefs, but it is also quite specific, in that it holds 
only under log utility.  Experimenting with a range of alternative utility functions and 
distributions of beliefs typically yields prediction market prices that diverge from the 
mean of beliefs by only a small amount. 
Both the Manski and Wolfers-Zitzewitz models are silent as to the sources of the 
different beliefs across traders, which allows them to sidestep the theoretical difficulty 
posed by Milgrom and Stokey (1982): that under common beliefs, no trade will occur.  
The logic of the “no trade theorem” is simply that each trader should always be wary that   4 
anyone seeking to trade with them possesses an information advantage, and hence should 
moderate their beliefs accordingly.  Explaining why there is any trade in prediction 
markets remains an important open theoretical question.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) 
provide a simple adaptation of the Kyle model in which trade is driven by uninformed 
outsiders with either hedging- or entertainment-driven demand for the prediction security, 
or by manipulators attempting to influence market prices. 
Another important role of prediction markets is that potential trading profits 
provide an incentive for information discovery.  Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) consider 
the case where information is expensive to garner.  They point to the impossibility of 
prices being fully efficient: if prices fully reflect information, then there is no incentive 
for any trader to gather that information.  Instead, they construct a model in which prices 
never fully reflect all of the information possessed by informed traders; in equilibrium the 
inefficiency in pricing is just sufficient to induce a proportion of traders to become 
informed. 
Another key advantage of prediction markets over alternative approaches to 
information aggregation is that they provide incentives for truthful revelation of beliefs.  
If prediction markets are to be used as inputs into future decisions, this may provide a 
countervailing incentive to trade dishonestly to manipulate prices.  While such 
manipulation would typically lead the manipulator to lose money, Hanson and Oprea 
(2005) have shown that these losses increase the rewards for informed trading, which 
may ultimately increase the accuracy of prediction market prices. 
 
 
Prediction Markets in Practice 
 
While we are still accumulating evidence on the behavior of prediction markets in 
different contexts, there are already a few generalizations that can be drawn from 
existing, albeit piecemeal evidence. 
First, market prices tend to respond rapidly to new information.  Figure 1 draws 
an interesting example from Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006): movements in the 
price of the Tradesports contract on the re-election of President Bush, around election   5 
day, 2004.  Early exit polls suggesting a Kerry victory were leaked at around 3pm, and 
prices started to move immediately.  Indeed, the figure shows that they moved in lockstep 
with prices on the much larger equity markets.  As the count proceeded, it became clear 
that these early polling numbers were wrong, and the market reversed course sharply. 
This is only a single anecdote but is representative of the rapid incorporation of new 
information by prediction markets observed in many domains. 
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
Second, in most cases, the time series of prices in these markets appears to follow 
a random walk, and simple betting strategies based on publicly available information 
appear to yield no profit opportunities.  That is, these markets appear to meet the standard 
definition of weak-form efficiency. 
Third, the law of one price appears to (roughly) hold, and the few arbitrage 
opportunities that arise in these markets are fleeting, and involve only small potential 
profits. 
Fourth, attempts at manipulating these markets typically fail.  Camerer (1998) 
attempted to manipulate pari-mutuel betting on horse races by canceling $500 bets at the 
last moment.  Rhode and Strumpf (2005) report attempts by specific political campaigns 
to manipulate the election betting odds on their candidates in the large-scale betting 
markets operating in the early 20
th century.  They also analyze an attempt to manipulate 
the price of a Kerry victory on Tradesports in 2004, as well as their own attempts to 
manipulate prices on the Iowa Electronic Markets in 2000.  None of these attempts at 
manipulation had a discernible effect on prices, except during a short transition phase. 
Finally, prediction markets typically provide quite accurate forecasts and have 
typically outperformed alternative prediction tools. 
Figure 2 shows evidence collected by Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2005) on the 
relative performance of a prediction market (the “Economic Derivatives” market 
established by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank), and a survey of economists, in 
predicting economic outcomes.  They show that the market-based forecast encompasses   6 
the information in the survey-based forecasts.  Moreover the behavioral anomalies that 
have been noted in survey-based forecasts are not evident in the market-based forecasts. 
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
Figure 3 compares the forecasting performance of the Iowa Electronic Markets 
and the Gallup Poll in predicting the outcomes of Presidential elections in the United 
States.  Over the 13 candidacies from 1988-2004, the average absolute error of the 
market-based forecasts was 1.6 percentage points, while the corresponding number for 
the Gallup Poll was 1.9 percentage points.  As Berg, Nelson, and Rietz (2003) discuss, 
the forecasting advantage of markets over the polls is probably even larger over long 
horizons, as polling numbers tend to be excessively volatile through the electoral cycle.  
The initial success of these forecasting methods in the United States has led to similar 
analysis of the forecasting power of prediction markets in Austria, Australia, Canada, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Taiwan. 
 
<Figure 3 here> 
 
Tests of prediction markets and expert opinions have also been conducted in a 
range of other domains.  The Hollywood Stock Exchange has generated forecasts of box 
office success and of Oscar winners, that have been more accurate than expert opinions 
(Pennock, Lawrence, Nielsen and Giles, 2001).  Both real and play-money markets have 
generated more accurate forecasts of the likely winners of NFL football games than all 
but a handful among 2000 self-professed experts (Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock 
and Galebach, 2004).  In the corporate context, the market established by Chen and Plott 
(2002) within Hewlett-Packard yielded more accurate sales forecasts then the firm’s 
internal experts.  Similarly, Ortner (1998) reports that an internal market correctly 
predicted that the firm would definitely fail to deliver on a software project on time, even 
when traditional planning tools suggested that the deadline could be met. 
Despite this impressive evidence, there still remain a number of documented 
pathologies in prediction markets.  Figure 4 shows evidence from Snowberg and Wolfers   7 
(2005) of the “favorite-longshot bias,” which describes a tendency to over-price low 
probability events.  A similar tendency has been documented in a range of other market 
contexts, suggesting that some caution is in order in interpreting the prices of low 
probability events. 
 
<Figure 4 here> 
 
Laboratory experiments also point to the possibility that in some contexts 
prediction markets will fail to aggregate information as efficiently as alternative 
procedures.  Sunder (1995) provides an excellent review of experimental prediction 
markets, including experiments showing market designs that fail to aggregate 




Economic Analysis of Prediction Market Prices 
 
Prediction markets are a useful way to elicit predictions, but how might they be used?  
The most direct form of inference involves simply using these predictions directly.  For 
instance, forecasts of election outcomes may be of intrinsic interest. 
Some analyses have tried to link the time series of expectations elicited in 
prediction markets with time series of other variables, so as to isolate a causal influence.  
For instance, Roberts (1990) analyzes changes in the betting odds posted by Ladbrokes 
on Ronald Reagan’s re-election and the returns to holding stocks in defense firms, 
inferring that Reagan led to more robust defense spending.  Likewise, Herron, et. al. 
(1999) and Knight (2005) analyze the correlation of individual stocks and industry 
indices with movements in the 1992 and 2000 Iowa Electronic Markets U.S. Presidential 
election markets.  Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) conduct a similar analysis for 
the aggregate equity and bond markets at an intraday frequency, using the data shown in 
Figure 1, to infer partisan impacts of the 2004 election.  Slemrod and Greimel (1999) 
examine the effect on municipal bond prices of changes in the probability of the   8 
Republicans nominating Steve Forbes, whose “flat tax” would have eliminated the tax 
exemption for municipal bond interest. 
Moving beyond ex-post studies of elections, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005b) report 
on an ex-ante analysis of the co-movement of oil and equity prices with a contract 
tracking the probability of a U.S. attack on Iraq in 2002-3 (Figure 5).  The results suggest 
that a substantial war premium was built into oil prices (and a discount built into 
equities). 
 
<Figure 5 here> 
 
The contracts we have described thus far have depended on only one outcome.  
The same principles can be applied to contracts tied to the outcomes of more than one 
event.  These contingent contracts potentially provide insight into the correlation between 
events.  For instance, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004b) ran experimental markets on the 
online betting exchange Tradesports.com in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election.  
In one example, they ran markets linked to whether George W. Bush would be re-elected, 
whether Osama bin Laden would be captured prior to the election, and whether both 
events would occur.  These markets suggested a 91 percent chance of Bush being re-
elected if Osama had been found, but a 67 percent unconditional probability.  Berg and 
Reitz (2003) report on contracts whose payoff was linked to 1996 Democratic vote shares 
conditional on different potential Republican nominees; on the basis of these prices they 
argue that alternative nominees, such as Colin Powell, would have outperformed Bob 
Dole. 
The potential to apply these markets to determine the consequences of a range of 
contingencies has led Hanson (1999) to term these “Decision Markets”.  Indeed, Hanson 
(2000) has suggested that such markets could be used to remove technocratic policy 
implementation issues from the bureaucracy, a suggestion endorsed in Hahn and Tetlock 
(2006).  Moreover, while the previous example involves only one contingency, Hanson 
(2003) suggests that market scoring rules can allow traders to simultaneously predict 
many combinations of outcomes.  The basic intuition of his proposal is that rather than   9 
betting on each contingency, traders bet that the sum of their errors over all predictions 
will be lower. 
However while contingent markets can be used to estimate the joint probability of 
choice A and outcome B, care must be taken before inferring that choice A should be 
made because it will maximize the probability of outcome B.  That is, while these 





The healthy bibliography below attests to the fact that interest in prediction 
markets has boomed in recent years.  Many questions remain.  Theoretical research holds 
the promise of better understanding the institutional design features that yield optimal 
information aggregation and efficient pricing.  The practical agenda includes developing 
new ideas about how and when prediction markets can aid decision-making by business 
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Table 1: Contract Types: Estimating Uncertain Quantities or Probabilities 






Contract costs $p 
Pays $1 if and only if 
event x occurs. 
Event x: George 
Bush wins the 
popular vote 
Probability that 










Contract pays $x. 
 
Contract pays 
$1 for every 
percentage point 
of the popular 
vote won by 
George Bush 
 
Mean value of 
outcome x: E[x] 
 
Contract pays 








Contract costs $1 
Pays $2 if x>x* 
Pays $0 otherwise. 
Bid according to the 
value of x*. 
 
Contract pays 
even money if 
Bush wins more 
than x*% of the 
popular vote. 
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Midnight 6 a.m. Noon 9 p.m. Midnight
Price of Bush re-election contract on Tradesports
Level of S&P 500
Source: Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006)
Election day 2004
Bush' s re-election prospects and the stockmarket
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Market forecast is closing price on election eve; Gallup forecast is final pre-election projection.
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